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Cooperative oligopoly games with boundedly rational
firms
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Abstract
We analyze cooperative Cournot games with boundedly rational firms. Due to cogni-
tive constraints, the members of a coalition cannot accurately predict the coalitional
structure of the non-members. Thus, they compute their value using simple heuris-
tics. In particular, they assign various non-equilibrium probability distributions over
the outsiders’ set of partitions. We construct the characteristic function of a coalition
in such an environment and we analyze the core of the corresponding games. We
show that the core is non-empty provided the number of firms in the market is suf-
ficiently large. Moreover, we show that if two distributions over the set of partitions
are related via first-order dominance, then the core of the game under the dominated
distribution is a subset of the core under the dominant distribution.
Keywords: Cooperative game; externalities; Cournot market; core; bounded rationality
JEL Classification: C71, L2
1 Introduction
Collusion among firms in oligopolistic markets is a wide-spread phenomenon and constantly
attracts the interest of economists. By colluding, firms can restrict output and raise market
prices, thus extracting a higher surplus from consumers. From a methodological point of
view, economists analyze collusion using either non-cooperative games (when agreements
among firms are non-enforceable by an outside entity) or cooperative games (whenever
the signing of enforceable agreements is possible). Under the latter approach, the focus
usually is on the core of an appropriately defined cooperative game. The core consists of
all allocations of total profits that cannot be blocked by any coalition of firms. Non-empty
core means that cooperation among all firms in the market is a priori feasible.
When a coalition of firms contemplate the blocking of an agreement, they have to
calculate their stand-alone payoff. In a market environment such a calculation is not a
trivial task, as the coalition’s worth depends on how the non-members act. In particular,
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it depends on the partition (coalition structure) that the outsiders will form. This calls for
the formation of beliefs about the outsiders’ coalitional actions.
Different conjectures about the reaction of the outsiders lead to different coalitional
worths and thus to different notions of core. The α and β cores (Aumann 1959) are based
on the assumption of min-max behavior on behalf of the non-members; the γ-core (Chander
& Tulkens 1997) is based on the assumption that outsiders play individual best replies to
the deviant coalition; the δ-core scenario (Hart & Kurz 1983) assumes that outsiders form
a single coalition. Various authors applied these core notions to the study of Cournot
markets. Rajan (1989) used the concept of γ-core and showed that it is non-empty for a
market with 4 firms. A more general result for any number of firms is provided by Chander
(2010). Currarini & Marini (2003) built a refinement of the γ-core by assuming that the
deviant coalition acts as a Stackelberg leader in the product market. Zhao (1999) showed
that the α and β cores of oligopolistic markets are non-empty.
The seminal work of Ray & Vohra (1999) goes one step further, as the worth of a
coalition is deduced via arguments that satisfy a consistency criterion: a deviant coalition
takes into account the fact that after its deviation, other deviations might follow, with
the newly deviant coalitions thinking in a similar forward way. For games where binding
agreements are feasible, Huang & Sjostrom (1998, 2003) and Koczy (2007) developed the
recursive core. The recursive core is constructed under the assumption that the members of
a coalition compute their value by looking recursively on the cores of the sub-games played
among the outsiders.
Predicting the equilibrium coalitional formation in a game with many players is com-
putationally cumbersome. Sandholm et.al (1999) showed that for an n-player game the
number of different coalition structures is O(nn) and ω(n
n
2 ). Hence, deducing the coalition
structure that the outsiders form is a particularly difficult task (at least, for games with a
large number of players). For example, finding the coalition structure that maximizes the
sum of all players’ payoffs is an NP -hard problem (Sandholm et.al 1999). Even finding
sub-optimal solutions requires the search of an exponential number of cases.
The last considerations give the motivation of the current paper. We analyze an n-firm
cooperative Cournot oligopoly assuming that no group of firms has the cognitive ability to
accurately deduce the partition that the outsiders will form. As a result, the members of a
coalition cannot compute their value with precision. Instead, they compute it by following
simple procedures or heuristics.
Clearly, the number of different heuristics one can adopt is very large. Computer scien-
tists, for example, model similar situations via search algorithms that give solutions within
certain bounds from the optimal coalition structure (Sandholm et.al 1999, Dang & Jennings
2004). On the other hand, the economists’ toolbox of heuristics includes models with play-
ers of various degrees of cognitive abilities (Stahl & Wilson 1994, Camerer 2003, Camerer
et.al 2004, Haruvy & Stahl 2007), models with probabilistic choice rules (McKelvey &
Palfrey 1995, Chen et.al 1997, Anderson et.al 2002), to name only a few.
In our paper, the heuristics are based on the assignment of non-equilibrium probability
distributions over the set of the opponents’ coalition structures. I.e, when contemplating
a deviation from the grand coalition, the members of a coalition make the simplifying
assumption that the reactions of the outsiders are governed by various plausible -but not
necessarily optimal- probability distributions.
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Our benchmark case assumes that the probability of a coalition structure is proportional
to the profitability that the structure induces for the outsiders. Namely, a deviant coalition
assumes it is more likely that its opponents will partition themselves according to the more
efficient structures. This approach is motivated by the logit quantal response model of
McKelvey & Palfrey (1995) in non-cooperative games, where the probability of a player
choosing a certain strategy depends on its relative payoff, with the probability being positive
even if the strategy is inferior. We derive the characteristic function of a coalition under such
a distribution -i.e, a logit type of distribution- and we examine the core of the corresponding
game. We show that if the number of firms in the market is sufficiently large then the core
is non-empty. Hence, bounded rationality supports cooperation among all firms in the
market.
In the second part of the paper, we extend our analysis by considering more general
probability distributions. In particular we consider distributions which are related via
first-order stochastic dominance. If a certain distribution dominates another one, it gives
relatively higher weight to partitions consisting of many coalitions. Our analysis has two
goals: first, given that a relatively less concentrated partition hurts a deviant coalition,
we present a novel way of modeling pessimism in a cooperative game with externalities.
Secondly, we utilize this machinery to analyze the core in a Cournot market under a large
number of distributions (other than the logit).
We fix a pair of distributions satisfying the first-order dominance property. We show
that the core of the game under the dominated distribution is contained in the core of
the game under the dominant. In particular, this implies that the core under the logit
distribution is contained in the core under any distribution that first-order dominates it.
Thus we indirectly show that our Cournot game has a non-empty core for a large number
of probability distributions.
In particular, the above inclusion holds for the case of γ-core. Namely, the core under the
logit distribution is contained in the core constructed under the assumption that outsiders
form singleton coalitions (in our terminology, the γ scenario corresponds to the degenerate
distribution that assigns probability one to the singletons partition). Hence our core refines
the γ-core.
In what follows, we present the basic model in section 2. In sections 3 and 4 we present
our results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a market with the set N = {1, 2, ..., n} of firms. Firms produce a homogeneous
product. Firm l produces quantity ql using the cost function C(ql) = cql, l ∈ N. The market
price p is determined via the inverse demand function p = p(Q), where Q = q1+q2+ ...+qn
is the total market quantity.
Assumptions
A1. ∃ Q0 > 0 such that p(Q) > 0 for Q < Q0 and p(Q) = 0 for Q ≥ Q0
A2. p′(Q) < 0, whenever p(Q) > 0
A3. p′(Q) + qip
′′(Q) < 0
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where p′(Q) and p′′(Q) denote the first and second derivatives of the inverse demand func-
tion. The above assumptions are standard and guarantee the existence and uniqueness of
Cournot equilibrium (see, for example, Vives 2001).
Let S ⊂ N denote a coalition of firms with |S| = s members and let N \ S denote the
complementary set of S, where |N \ S| = n− s. The worth or value of S is the sum of its
members’ profits. These profits depend on how the members of N \S partition themselves
into coalitions. The set N \ S can be partitioned into disjoint subsets in Bn−s ways, where
Bn−s is Bell’s (n− s)
th number (Bell 1934).
What matters for S is only the number of the opponent coalitions in the Cournot
market. Consider for example the case N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and S = {1}. The set of
outsiders is N \S = {2, 3, 4, 5}. Consider the partitions {{2, 3}, {4, 5}} and {{2, 3, 4}, {5}}
of outsiders. These partitions are equivalent for S (and so are all partitions with two
coalitions) in the sense that both induce the same profit for S (in both cases, S would
compete in a triopoly market). More generally, all partitions with j coalitions induce the
same profit for S, irrespective of how the outsiders are grouped among the j coalitions. We
will call these partitions j-similar, where j = 1, 2, ..., n− s.
Denote the number of j-similar partitions by Kn−s,j, where Kn−s,j gives the number of
ways to partition a set of n − s objects into j groups, or else the Stirling number of the
second kind. Then
Kn−s,j =
1
j!
j∑
i=0
(−1)i
(
j
i
)
(j − i)n−s (1)
The basic assumption that underlies this paper is that the members of S use simple prob-
abilistic models in order to predict the coalitional behavior of the non-members. As a
benchmark case, we assume that the probability of a partition is proportional to the prof-
itability that the partition induces for the outsiders. This approach is in line with the spirit
of the logit quantal response model (McKelvey & Palfrey 1995) in non-cooperative games,
where the probability of choosing a strategy depends on its relative payoff, the probability
being positive even if the strategy is inferior.
Consider again a coalition S with s members and an outsiders’ partition with j coali-
tions. Let Πj denote the sum of the profits that the j coalitions earn under this partition
(this sum is constant over all j-similar partitions). Define
fn,s(j) =
eΠjKn−s,j
n−s∑
m=1
eΠmKn−s,m
(2)
Notice that fn,s(j) ∈ (0, 1) and
n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j) = 1. Then, fn,s(j) gives the total probability
that S assigns to all j-similar structures. Note in (2) that the profitability of a j-similar
partition is adjusted by the corresponding Stirling number. The results of the paper hold
even if such an adjustment does not take place.
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2.1 An example
Let us illustrate the above by considering an example with five firms, N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}.
Assume that the inverse demand is p = 1−Q and that c = 0. Consider again a coalition S
with s members. If the n− s outsiders form j coalitions then there are j +1 active players
in the market. By simple calculations, the total profits of the j outside coalitions then are
Πj =
j
(j + 2)2
, j = 1, 2, ..., n− s (3)
Consider a singleton coalition, say S = {1}. Then Bn−s = B4 = 15 and K4,1 = K4,4 =
1, K4,2 = 7, K4,3 = 6. Using (2) and (3) the probabilities that S assigns to outsiders’
partitions are
f5,1(1) = f5,1(4) =
e1/9
Z1
, f5,1(2) =
7e1/8
Z1
, f5,1(3) =
6e3/25
Z1
where Z1 = 2e
1/9 + 7e1/8 + 6e3/25. Consider next a coalition with two members, say S =
{1, 2}. Then Bn−s = B3 = 5 and K3,1 = K3,3 = 1, K3,2 = 3. We then have
f5,2(1) =
e1/9
Z2
, f5,2(2) =
3e1/8
Z2
, f5,2(3) =
e3/25
Z2
where Z2 = e
1/9+3e1/8+e3/25. Consider next a coalition with three members S = {1, 2, 3}.
In this case, Bn−s = B2 = 2 and K2,1 = K2,2 = 1. Hence we have
f5,3(1) =
e1/9
Z3
, f5,3(2) =
e1/8
Z3
where Z3 = e
1/9+e1/8. Finally, if a deviant coalition has four members, it faces one outsider
only and so there is no ambiguity.
2.2 The game (N, vn)
In this section we compute the characteristic function of a deviant coalition. We use the
j-similarity and focus for each j on one representative of the j-similar partitions. Let qs
denote the quantity of the deviant coalition S; and let qji denote the quantity of outside
coalition i, i = 1, 2, ..., j, under a partition with j members. The objective function that S
faces is given by
pif (S) =
n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j)
(
p(qs +
j∑
i=1
qji )− c
)
qs (4)
The objective function of coalition i is
piji =
(
p(qs +
j∑
r=1,r 6=i
qjr + q
j
i )− c
)
qji , i = 1, 2, ..., j
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Hence the maximization problems to solve for are
max
qs
pif (S) (5)
and for j = 1, 2, ..., n− s,
max
qji
piji , i = 1, 2, ..., j (6)
Let q˜s(f) = argmax
qs
pif (S) denote the best reply function of S; and let q˜
j
i = argmax
qji
piji
denote the best reply1 of coalition i, i = 1, 2, ..., j where j = 1, 2, ..., n− s. If we solve the
system of equations defined by the best replies we end up with the reduced-form solution
in quantities, which shall be denoted by qs(f) and q
j
i (f). By straightforward calculations,
the reduced-form solution is given implicitly by
qs(f) =
n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j)p(qs(f) + jq
j
i (f))− c
−
n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j)p′(qs(f) + jq
j
i (f))
(7)
and for j = 1, 2, ..., n− s,
qji (f) =
p(qs(f) + jq
j
i (f))− c
−p′(qs(f) + jq
j
i (f))
, i = 1, 2, ..., j (8)
where we used the fact that qj1(f) = q
j
2(f) = ... = q
j
j (f). Using (7) and (8) in (4), we
obtain the characteristic function of S. We denote this function by vn(S) or vn(s). Letting
Qj(f) = qs(f) + jq
j
i (f) we have
vn(S) =
( n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j)p(Qj(f))− c
)2
−
n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j)p′(Qj(f))
(9)
Hence our game is the pair (N, vn) where vn is defined by (9). The value of the grand coali-
tion is denoted by vn(N) or vn(n). This value is the monopoly profit (which is independent
of n but for notational uniformity we keep the superscript). Denote by QM the monopoly
output. Then it is easy to show that
vn(N) =
(
p(QM)− c
)2
−p′(QM )
1Clearly the best replies depend on the quantities of the opponents but for notational simplicity we
drop writing them.
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An allocation is a vector (x1, x2, ..., xn) such that
∑
i∈N
xi = v
n(N). The core Cf of (N, v
n) is
the set of all allocations that cannot be blocked by any coalition, given distribution fn,s.
I.e., the core is the set
Cf =
{
(x1, ..., xn) :6 ∃S with v
n(S) >
∑
i∈S
xi
}
Given the above, in the next sections we examine the core for various demand and proba-
bility functions.
3 Results
The first result in this section states the following useful property.
Lemma 1 For every positive integer k, the equality vn(s) = vn+k(s+ k) holds.
Proof Consider two markets: in the first market there are n firms and the deviant coalition
S has s members and in the second there are n+k firms and S has s+k members. Consider
a number j of outside coalitions. Notice that in the first market, j runs from 1 up to n− s;
in the second market, j runs from 1 up to n+k− (s+k) = n−s again. The total profits of
j outside coalitions under the first market are equal to their total profits under the second
market. This is due to the constant returns to scale assumption. In both cases, these
profits are Πj. Hence
fn,s(j) =
eΠjKn−s,j
n−s∑
m=1
eΠmKn−s,m
=
eΠjKn+k−(s+k),j
n+k−(s+k)∑
m=1
eΠmKn+k−(s+k),m
= fn+k,s+k(j) (10)
Moreover for each j, qs(f) and q
j
i (f) are constant under the two markets (again due to
constant returns to scale): namely, the quantity of S when it has s members and the
market has n firms is equal to its quantity when S has s+ k members and the market has
n + k firms; the same holds for qji (f) and by consequence for Qj(f). Combining this fact
with (10) and (9) proves the result.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is clear. If coalition S has s+ k members in a market with
n+ k firms, it faces n+ k− (s+ k) = n− s outsiders. This equals the number of outsiders
that S faces when it has s members in a market with n firms. Hence S faces the same set
of potential coalition structures.
An almost immediate implication of Lemma 1 is the monotonicity of vn(s) in s.
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Lemma 2 For every n, vn(s) is strictly increasing in s.
Proof The proof will be based on induction. For the base case, n = 2, we have to prove
that v2(2) > v2(1) > v2(0). Recall that v2(2) is the monopoly profit and v2(1) is the profit
of a firm when two firms are in the market. Under assumptions A1-A3 we have that the
former profit is higher than the latter,2 i.e., v2(2) > v2(1). Moreover, v2(1) > 0 = v2(0)
and so we have the base case.
Assume for the induction hypothesis that in a game with n players and for an arbitrary
s, we have that vn(s) > vn(s− 1). We will prove that vn+1(s) > vn+1(s− 1). By Lemma 1
and the induction hypothesis we have that vn+1(s) = vn(s− 1) > vn(s− 2) = vn+1(s− 1).
Note also that vn+1(s + 1) > vn+1(s) (by Lemma 1) and that vn+1(1) > vn+1(0) = 0. This
completes the proof.
Lemmas 1 and 2 hold under any demand function (that satisfies assumptions A1-A3 ).
In what follows, we use these Lemmas to derive conditions for core non-emptiness under
certain demand functions. In particular we will focus on the family of demand functions
Q = 1− pb, b > 0
which we borrow from Anderson & Engers (1992). Note that if b > (<) 1, demand is
concave (convex); and if b = 1, demand is linear. In order to derive analytically the market
solution for an arbitrary b we need to set c = 0. The relevant calculations appear in Lemma
A1 in the Appendix. The solution, i.e, the quantities and the characteristic function, is
given by
qs(f) =
n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j)ψ
1
b
j
n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j)ψ
1
b
j (1 + j + 1/b)
(11)
qji (f) = bψj
n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j)ψ
1
b
j (j + 1/b)
n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j)ψ
1
b
j (1 + j + 1/b)
, i = 1, 2, ..., j (12)
vn(S) =
n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j)
( n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j)ψ
1
b
j (j + 1/b)
(bj + 1)
n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j)ψ
1
b
j (1 + j + 1/b)
) 1
b
qs(f) (13)
where ψj =
1
bj + 1
. Finally it is easy to see that the value of the grand coalition is
vn(N) =
b
(1 + b)
1
b
+1
2See Amir and Lambson (2000).
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3.1 The case b = 1
As a benchmark case, we first present a result for the linear demand, i.e., b = 1. Afterwards,
we discuss the non-linear case.
Proposition 1 Assume the demand function is given by Q = 1 − p. If n is sufficiently
large then Cf 6= ∅.
Proof Since firms are identical, the core is non-empty if and only if for all s ≤ n,
vn(n)
n
≥
vn(s)
s
(14)
It is easy to verify that the above inequality does not hold for 3 ≤ n ≤ 11. So for these
values of n the core is empty.3 The inequality holds for n = 12 (Table 2 in the Appendix).
We will prove the rest of the proposition using induction on n, where n ≥ 12.
Base: Table 2 in the Appendix establishes the base case (n = 12).
Induction hypothesis: For all S : |S| = s ≤ n,
vn(n)
n
≥
vn(s)
s
.
Induction step: We will show that for all S : |S| = s ≤ n+ 1,
vn+1(n+ 1)
n + 1
≥
vn+1(s)
s
By Lemma 1 we have that vn+1(s) = vn+1((s− 1) + 1) = vn(s− 1) and also vn+1(n+ 1) =
vn(n). So we have to show that
vn(n)
n+ 1
≥
vn(s− 1)
s
(15)
From the Induction hypothesis we have
vn(n) ≥
n
s− 1
vn(s− 1)
and thus
(s− 1)vn(n) ≥ nvn(s− 1) (16)
Using Lemma 2,
vn(n) > vn(s− 1) (17)
Adding (16) and (17) we have
svn(n) > (n+ 1)vn(s− 1)
3For 3 ≤ n ≤ 11 it holds that vn(1) > v
n(n)
n
(see Table 3 in the Appendix). The relevant calculations
were made using the Maple program and they are available by the authors upon request.
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which implies that (15) holds. So we have the proof for n + 1 and thus the proposition is
proved.
The monopoly profit is independent of the number of firms n. On the other hand, vn(s)
decreases in n. As a result, for sufficiently large n the difference vn(n)/n−vn(s)/s becomes
positive for all s and the core is non-empty.
3.2 The case b 6= 1
In this section we discuss the non-emptiness of the core for the non-linear demand case.
To this end, we will utilize the previous results, i.e., Lemmas 1 and 2, and Proposition
1. Recall that Lemmas 1 and 2 hold for any demand function. Furthermore, among the
three steps of the induction proof of Proposition 1, i.e., base step, induction hypothesis and
induction step, essentially only the base step depends on the demand function used. The
other two steps work independently of the demand function (given of course the validity
of the base step). Hence when extending Proposition 1 to cases where b 6= 1 we only need
to ensure the validity of the base step. Namely, for a certain value of b we need to find a
specific number of firms that provides the base step of the induction argument (we refer
the reader to page 9, in the proof of Proposition 1).
Due to the complexity of the model, we do not address the above task for all values of
b. Nonetheless, Table 1 (next page) presents pairs of numbers (b∗, n(b∗)) that satisfy the
property discussed above: given a certain value b∗ (where b∗ 6= 1), the table reports a value
n(b∗) which is the number of firms that establishes the base step of the induction process
for the demand function Q = 1−pb
∗
. In other words, given a specific value b∗, the game has
non-empty core for n ≥ n(b∗) and it has empty core for n < n(b∗). We note that Table 1
provides values b∗ for which the demand function can be either convex (b∗ < 1) or concave
(b∗ > 1).
In the Table we note that as b∗ increases, the core is non-empty less often (as b∗ increases,
the number n(b∗) increases). Moreover, if b∗ is sufficiently low, the core is non-empty for
all n ≥ 3.
4 First-order stochastic dominance
In this section we compare the cores of games that differ with respect to the probability
schemes assigned to outsiders’ partitions. In particular, we consider distributions that are
related via first-order stochastic dominance. We will show that if a certain distribution
dominates at first-order another one, then the core under the dominated distribution is a
subset of the core under the dominant distribution. An application of this result is that
Proposition 1 holds under any distribution that dominates the distribution defined in (2).
Consider coalition S. Let zn,s and wn,s be two probability distributions over the set of
the outsiders’ partitions. Assume that zn,s dominates wn,s at first-order, i.e., for all j
∗,
j∗∑
j=1
zn,s(j) ≤
j∗∑
j=1
wn,s(j)
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b∗ n(b∗)
0.5 3
0.6 5
0.7 6
0.8 7
0.9 9
1.1 15
1.2 19
1.3 24
1.4 32
1.5 42
1.6 57
1.7 78
1.8 107
1.9 147
2.0 205
Table 1: b∗ and n(b∗) for base step of induction.
Denote by Cw and Cz the cores under the two distributions and assume that Cz 6= ∅. We
have the following result.
Proposition 2 Assume the inverse demand p(Q) is weakly concave. If zn,s stochastically
dominates wn,s at first-order then Cw ⊆ Cz.
Proof For j = 1, 2, ..., n− s, denote Q˜−sj =
j∑
i=1
q˜ji , where q˜
j
i = argmax
qji
piji (recall that pi
j
i is
the objective function of coalition i in a partition with j coalitions). Let piw(S) and piz(S)
denote the objective functions of S under distributions wn,s and zn,s respectively. Let
q˜s(w) = argmax
qs
piw(S), q˜s(z) = argmax
qs
piz(S)
Denote by qs(w), q
j
i (w) and Q
−s
j (w) =
j∑
i=1
qji (w) the reduced-form solution of the system
of equations defined by the above best replies when the probability distribution is wn,s;
and by qs(z), q
j
i (z) and Q
−s
j (z) =
j∑
i=1
qji (z) the reduced-form solution when the probability
distribution is zn,s. Finally, denote by v
n
w(S) and v
n
z (S) the characteristic functions of
coalition S under wn,s and zn,s respectively.
We first have that
Q˜−sj+1 > Q˜
−s
j , j = 1, 2, ..., n− s− 1
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This follows by Amir & Lambson (2000, Theorem 2.2 (b)). Next define
p˜iw(S) =
n−s∑
j=1
wn,s(j)
(
p(qs + Q˜
−s
j )− c
)
qs ≡
n−s∑
j=1
wn,s(j)pis(qs, Q˜
−s
j )
and
p˜iz(S) =
n−s∑
j=1
zn,s(j)
(
p(qs + Q˜
−s
j )− c
)
qs ≡
n−s∑
j=1
zn,s(j)pis(qs, Q˜
−s
j )
where
pis(qs, Q˜
−s
j ) ≡
(
p(qs + Q˜
−s
j )− c
)
qs, j = 1, 2, ..., n− s
Notice that since Q˜−sj+1 > Q˜
−s
j , we have
pis(qs, Q˜
−s
j ) > pis(qs, Q˜
−s
j+1), j = 1, 2, ..., n− s− 1 (18)
where the last inequality is due to the fact that the profit of a firm in a Cournot market is
decreasing in the (individual or aggregate) quantities of the other firms. Notice next that
p˜iw(S)− p˜iz(S) =
(
wn,s(1)− zn,s(1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
)
pis(qs, Q˜
−s
1 ) +
n−s∑
j=2
(
wn,s(j)− zn,s(j)
)
pis(qs, Q˜
−s
j )
>
(
wn,s(1)− zn,s(1)
)
pis(qs, Q˜
−s
2 ) +
n−s∑
j=2
(
wn,s(j)− zn,s(j)
)
pis(qs, Q˜
−s
j )
=
(
wn,s(1) + wn,s(2)− zn,s(1)− zn,s(2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
)
pis(qs, Q˜
−s
2 )
+
n−s∑
j=3
(
wn,s(j)− zn,s(j)
)
pis(qs, Q˜
−s
j )) (19)
where the inequality is due to (18). Continuing the iterations on j, we eventually have that
p˜iw(S)− p˜iz(S) >
( n−s−1∑
j=1
wn,s(j)−
n−s−1∑
j=1
zn,s(j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
)
pis(qs, Q˜
−s
n−s−1)
+
(
wn,s(n− s)− zn,s(n− s)
)
pis(qs, Q˜
−s
n−s)
>
( n−s∑
j=1
wn,s(j)−
n−s∑
j=1
zn,s(j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
)
pis(qs, Q˜
−s
n−s) = 0 (20)
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where we again used (18). We conclude that for all qs and the corresponding Q˜
−s
j , we have
n−s∑
j=1
wn,s(j)pis(qs, Q˜
−s
j ) >
n−s∑
j=1
zn,s(j)pis(qs, Q˜
−s
j ) (21)
In the Appendix we show that if the inverse demand function p(Q) is weakly concave then
Q−sj (w) < Q
−s
j (z) (Lemma A2 in the Appendix). Notice next that
vnw(S) =
n−s∑
j=1
wn,s(j)pis(qs(w), Q
−s
j (w))
≥
n−s∑
j=1
wn,s(j)pis(qs(z), Q
−s
j (w))
≥
n−s∑
j=1
wn,s(j)pis(qs(z), Q
−s
j (z))
>
n−s∑
j=1
zn,s(j)pis(qs(z), Q
−s
j (z)) = v
n
z (S) (22)
where the first inequality is due to the fact that qs(w) is the optimal choice of coalition S
against Q−sj (w), j = 1, 2, ..., n − s; the second inequality holds because Q
−s
j (w) < Q
−s
j (z)
and because the Cournot profit of a firm decreases in the quantities of the other firms; and
the third inequality is due to (21). Since vnw(S) > v
n
z (S) we conclude that Cw ⊆ Cz.
As an application of Proposition 2, we note that Proposition 1 holds not only under fn,s
but also under any distribution that dominates fn,s at first order.
Corollary 1 Assume the demand function is given by Q = 1−p. Consider any distribution
zn,s that dominates distribution (2) at first-order. Then Cz 6= ∅ if n is sufficiently large.
Proof If demand is linear and n is large then Cf 6= ∅ (Proposition 1). Since zn,s dominates
distribution (2) at first-order then Cf ⊆ Cz. Hence the latter core is non-empty.
Compared to the cumulative distribution of fn,s, the cumulative distribution of zn,s assigns
higher probabilities to events that include partitions with many coalitions. Clearly, these
events are unfavorable for S, hence the use of zn,s indicates some sort of pessimism (rela-
tively to fn,s) on behalf of the members of S. This approach can be motivated by resorting
to the theory of risk measurement, which often measures risk by assigning relatively high
probabilities to unfavorable events (see e.g, Acerbi 2002).4 Our analysis provides a novel
way of tracing the impact of pessimism or risk in a cooperative game with externalities.
Finally we note that a particular distribution that dominates fn,s is the distribution
defined by ẑn,s(j) = 0, for j = 1, 2, ..., n − s − 1 and ẑn,s(n − s) = 1. This distribution
4We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this connection.
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corresponds to the γ-core scenario. It is known that the latter core is non-empty for
general Cournot oligopolies (Chander 2010). Letting Cẑ denote the γ-core, we have the
following corollary.
Corollary 2 The inclusion Cf ⊆ Cẑ holds.
The γ-core is based on the worst scenario for S: all n − s firms remain separate entities.
Under fn,s, the singleton coalitions structure is just one of the partitions that S takes into
account. Other, more favorable, partitions occur with positive probability. Hence, the
value of S under fn,s is higher than its value under ẑn,s.
Corollaries 1 and 2 are stated in terms of the linear demand function. We note that
similar statements hold for the non-linear demand case (we refer the reader to section 3.2
that presents cases of non-linear demand functions for which the core is non-empty).
5 Conclusions
This paper analyzed cooperative Cournot games. The analysis is based on the assertion
that when a coalition contemplates a deviation from the grand coalition, it assigns various
non-equilibrium distributions on the set of partitions that the outsiders can form. This
assumption is justified by imposing cognitive constraints on behalf of the firms in the
market. Provided that the number of firms is sufficiently high, the core is non-empty for a
large number of probability distributions and demand functions.
Let us mention a few extensions of the current work. The analysis of oligopolistic mar-
kets with more general cost functions and/or other modes of competition (e.g., product
differentiation, price competition) are natural future directions. Furthermore, the applica-
tion of the current framework to other economic environments or to abstract cooperative
games with externalities is of interest.
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Appendix
s vn(s) vn(s)/s
1 0.02047 0.02047
2 0.02273 0.01136
3 0.02544 0.00848
4 0.02876 0.00719
5 0.03289 0.00657
6 0.03815 0.00635
7 0.04503 0.00643
8 0.05443 0.00680
9 0.06795 0.00755
10 0.08736 0.00873
11 0.11111 0.01010
12 0.25000 0.02083
Table 2: values vn(s) and vn(s)/s with n = 12
15
n vn(1) vn(n)/n
3 0.08736 0.08333
4 0.06795 0.06250
5 0.05444 0.05000
6 0.04503 0.04166
7 0.03815 0.03571
8 0.03289 0.03125
9 0.02876 0.02777
10 0.02544 0.02500
11 0.02273 0.02272
Table 3: values vn(1) and vn(n)/n, n ∈ {3, 4, ..., 11}
Lemma A1 Assume the demand function is Q = 1− pb. Then the characteristic function
is given by (13).
Proof The profit function of coalition i under a partition with j members is
piji = (1− qs −
j∑
r=1,r 6=i
qjr − q
j
i )
1
b qji , i = 1, 2, ..., j (23)
Note that
∂piji
∂qji
= 0⇔ b(1− qs − q
j
i −
j∑
r=1,r 6=i
qjr) = q
j
i (24)
By symmetry, all j outside coalitions produce the same. So let qjr = q
j
i , for all r. Therefore
by (24), b(1− qs − jq
j
i ) = q
j
i and hence
q˜ji =
b(1 − qs)
bj + 1
(25)
The objective function of the deviant coalition S is
pif (S) =
n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j)(1− qs −
j∑
i=1
qji )
1
b qs (26)
Note that
∂pif (S)
∂qs
= 0 if
n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j)(1− qs −
j∑
i=1
qji )
1
b =
1
b
n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j)(1− qs −
j∑
i=1
qji )
1
b
−1qs (27)
Using (25), (27) becomes
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n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j)
(1− qs
1 + bj
) 1
b =
1
b
n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j)
(1− qs
1 + bj
) 1
b
−1
qs
and hence
(1− qs)
1
b
n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j)
( 1
1 + bj
) 1
b =
1
b
(1− qs)
1
b
−1
n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j)
( 1
1 + bj
) 1
b
−1
qs
Define ψj =
1
bj + 1
. Then rearranging the above relation gives
qs
( n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j)ψ
1
b
j +
1
b
n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j)ψ
1
b
−1
j
)
=
n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j)ψ
1
b
j (28)
Notice that
n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j)ψ
1
b
j +
1
b
n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j)ψ
1
b
−1
j =
n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j)ψ
1
b
j (1 +
1
bψj
) =
n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j)ψ
1
b
j (1 + (bj + 1)/b) =
n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j)ψ
1
b
j (1 + j + 1/b) (29)
Using (28) and (29) we get
qs(f) =
n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j)ψ
1
b
j
n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j)ψ
1
b
j (1 + j + 1/b)
(30)
Using (30), (25) becomes
qji (f) = bψj
n−s∑
j=1
ψ
1
b
j (j + 1/b)
n−s∑
j=1
fn,s(j)ψ
1
b
j (1 + j + 1/b)
(31)
Plugging (30) and (31) in (26) gives us (13).
Lemma A2 Assume the inverse demand p(Q) is weakly concave. Then Q−sj (w) < Q
−s
j (z),
j = 1, 2, ..., n− s.
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Proof Fix Q−sj . For notational convenience, define F (qs) ≡
n−s∑
j=1
wn,s(j)pis(qs, Q
−s
j ) and
H(qs) ≡
n−s∑
j=1
zn,s(j)pis(qs, Q
−s
j ). Then q˜s(w) and q˜s(z) satisfy respectively the first-order
conditions
∂F (qs)
∂qs
= 0 and
∂H(qs)
∂qs
= 0 or equivalently
n−s∑
j=1
wn,s(j)p
′(qs +Q
−s
j )qs +
n−s∑
j=1
wn,s(j)p(qs +Q
−s
j )− c = 0 (32)
and
n−s∑
j=1
zn,s(j)p
′(qs +Q
−s
j )qs +
n−s∑
j=1
zn,s(j)p(qs +Q
−s
j )− c = 0 (33)
The function F (qs) is strictly concave in qs (by assumptions A1-A3). Hence q˜s(w) > q˜s(z)
if and only if
∂F (q˜s(z))
∂qs
> 0. By (32) we have that
∂F (q˜s(z))
∂qs
> 0⇔
n−s∑
j=1
wn,s(j)p
′(q˜s(z) +Q
−s
j )q˜s(z) +
n−s∑
j=1
wn,s(j)p(q˜s(z) +Q
−s
j )− c > 0 (34)
Solving for q˜s(z) by (33) and plugging in (34) we have that
∂F (q˜s(z))
∂qs
> 0⇔
n−s∑
j=1
wn,s(j)p
′(q˜s(z) +Q
−s
j )
−
n−s∑
j=1
zn,s(j)p′(q˜s(z) +Q
−s
j )
( n−s∑
j=1
zn,s(j)p(q˜s(z) +Q
−s
j )− c
)
+
n−s∑
j=1
wn,s(j)p(q˜s(z) +Q
−s
j )− c > 0 (35)
We now use the concavity assumption and claim that
n−s∑
j=1
wn,s(j)p
′(q˜s(z) +Q
−s
j )
−
n−s∑
j=1
zn,s(j)p′(q˜s(z) +Q
−s
j )
≥ −1 (36)
To show the above we can equivalently show
n−s∑
j=1
wn,s(j)p
′(q˜s(z) +Q
−s
j )−
n−s∑
j=1
zn,s(j)p
′(q˜s(z) +Q
−s
j ) ≥ 0 (37)
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We have
n−s∑
j=1
wn,s(j)p
′(q˜s(z) +Q
−s
j )−
n−s∑
j=1
zn,s(j)p
′(q˜s(z) +Q
−s
j ) =
(
wn,s(1)− zn,s(1)
)
p′(q˜s(z) +Q
−s
1 ) +
n−s∑
j=2
(
wn,s(j)− zn,s(j)
)
p′(q˜s(z) +Q
−s
j ) ≥
(
wn,s(1)− zn,s(1)
)
p′(q˜s(z) +Q
−s
2 ) +
n−s∑
j=2
(
wn,s(j)− zn,s(j)
)
p′(q˜s(z) +Q
−s
j )
where the inequality holds because wn,s(1)− zn,s(1) ≥ 0 and because the weak concavity of
price implies that p′(q˜s(z)+Q
−s
1 ) ≥ p
′(q˜s(z)+Q
−s
2 ) (recall that Q
−s
1 < Q
−s
2 ). If we continue
the process of iterating j, we end up with (37). Since the latter condition holds, we have
that
n−s∑
j=1
wn,s(j)p
′(q˜s(z) +Q
−s
j )
−
n−s∑
j=1
zn,s(j)p′(q˜s(z) +Q
−s
j )
( n−s∑
j=1
zn,s(j)p(q˜s(z)+Q
−s
j )−c
)
+
n−s∑
j=1
wn,s(j)p(q˜s(z)+Q
−s
j )−c ≥
−
( n−s∑
j=1
zn,s(j)p(q˜s(z) +Q
−s
j )− c
)
+
n−s∑
j=1
wn,s(j)p(q˜s(z) +Q
−s
j )− c =
n−s∑
j=1
wn,s(j)p(q˜s(z) +Q
−s
j )−
n−s∑
j=1
zn,s(j)p(q˜s(z) +Q
−s
j ) (38)
But expression (38) can be written as(
wn,s(1)− zn,s(1)
)
p(q˜s(z) +Q
−s
1 ) +
n−s∑
j=2
(
wn,s(j)− zn,s(j)
)
p(q˜s(z) +Q
−s
j ) >
(
wn,s(1)− zn,s(1)
)
p(q˜s(z) +Q
−s
2 ) +
n−s∑
j=2
(
wn,s(j)− zn,s(j)
)
p(q˜s(z) +Q
−s
j )
where the last inequality holds because Q−s1 < Q
−s
2 . Continuing the iterations on j, we end
up with
n−s∑
j=1
wn,s(j)p(q˜s(z) +Q
−s
j )−
n−s∑
j=1
zn,s(j)p(q˜s(z) +Q
−s
j ) > 0 (39)
Combining (5), (38) and (39) we conclude that
∂F (q˜s(z))
∂qs
> 0 and hence q˜s(w) > q˜s(z).
But then Q−sj (w) < Q
−s
j (z), since Q
−s
j (w) and Q
−s
j (z) emerge from Q˜
−s
j for qs = q˜s(w) and
qs = q˜s(z) respectively and commodities in a Cournot market are substitutes.
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